North
Hollywood Bank Robbery & Shootout
February 28,
1997
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Assessment of LAPD's Response, by Ron McCarthy, retired long-time member of the LAPD Metropolitan Division S.W.A.T. Team
One
of the most compelling deadly force confrontations was played out
for the entire world to see when the Los Angeles Police
Department responded to a bank robbery of monumental proportions
and of great tactical significance. Very few shootouts have
provided us with the significant learning points that the North
Hollywood Bank Robbery Shootout embodied.
This
incident, if reviewed with an eye toward "social"
significance and recent law enforcement history in mind, is also
an example of long held beliefs and traditional law enforcement
concepts that are always under attack, but have been validated as
the right way to train the police, because of this shooting.
In
order to evaluate this shooting with clarity, it is necessary to
separate the significant issues and learning points by category.
As the bank robbery was discovered by alert patrol officers, this
analysis will begin with the category of initial response. An
assessment of weaponry used by the police as well as those used
by the suspects will follow. A review of the body armor issues
from the armor worn by the police to the armor worn by the
suspects will occur. Following the armor review, an inspection of
the response and actions of the Los Angeles Police SWAT team will
be done. Finally, a discussion of the long term significance of
this incident and how it may change law enforcement for the
better will follow.
INITIAL
OBSERVATION RESPONSE
Uniform
patrol officers were on routine patrol when they saw the bank
robbers with ski masks over their faces and assault rifles in
hand entering the bank. Immediate communication of what the
officers had observed resulted in rapid response and excellent
containment around the bank by the patrol forces that responded.
As the robbers fired their assault rifles inside the bank and
physically assaulted the men, women, and children who were
employees and customers in the bank, the patrol containment grew.
Many minutes went by while the robbers made every effort to steal
all the money they could carry. More than three hundred and
thirty thousand dollars was taken at gunpoint.
As
the robbers exited the bank, they were ordered to "freeze,
drop your guns!" The robbers opened up on the patrol
officers and the citizens in the community with a barrage of .223
and .308 gunfire both semi-automatic and full automatic. It was
obvious to the officers that they were being shot at and wounded
by a barrage of heavy weapons fire. This weapons fire was also
wounding citizens trapped behind cars, proned out in streets and
parking lots, fleeing on foot and in vehicles from the area. It
was also obvious that the police were not going away. Although
the officers were outgunned and out equipped, the patrol
containment was complete, remained steadfast, and would not let
the heavily armed suspects leave. There was a heavy price to pay
for this bravery and devotion to duty.
The
initial observation and rapid deployment was accomplished through
professional fundamental training. There is no question that
cover and concealment aided officers in reducing the number that
were wounded, but the incredible level of violence that was
directed at the police and the sheer volume of gunfire that the
suspects directed at the officers over a long period of time
speaks volumes about their quality and performance of the patrol
officers.
As
the suspects fled the bank and began their murderous full
automatic assault rifle attack on the patrol officers, it was
apparent that they were attempting to breach an escape route
through the uniformed containment. The fact that a large number
of officers were able to respond and deploy was a big component
of a brave effort to hold the suspects at the bank.
Large
departments have an advantage in the availability of large
numbers of officers to respond. The LAPD had approximately 15
patrol officers deployed around all four sides of the bank as the
suspects exited. Small agencies must work together to ensure that
similar crimes that are predictably going to happen to them have
a multi-agency response that replicates a large agency
activation. If only four or five officers were on scene at the
North Hollywood Bank of America, the suspects would have breached
containment the suspects would have been able to concentrate
focus and gunfire on more specific targets.
Several
years ago, a similar robbery in the community of Norco,
California, created a shootout of parallel dimensions. Five
suspects with assault rifles and explosives robbed the bank in
Norco and fled. They shot eleven police officers, killing one,
and shot down a police helicopter during a pursuit that lasted
for over an hour. Eventually all suspects were captured or
killed, but the cost was high.
BODY
ARMOR - BANDITS AND SWAT
We
can learn much about body armor from the North Hollywood
Shootout. While the suspects had armored themselves to the point
they were protected from their feet to their necks, it was
obvious they had "overdone" it. They were unable to
move swiftly and with tactical flexibility and this hampered
their ability to escape. They were unable to "flex" to
the degree that they needed to take complete cover positions
behind low profile cover. The SWAT officers that responded had a
reasonable level of tactical armor protection and had mobility
that allowed them to rapidly deploy from their vehicle. They were
able to prone out and regain their feet rapidly.
SWAT
RESPONSE
The
rapid and absolute aggressive tactics of the SWAT officers was
paramount in the successful neutralization of the suspect
Martasaurano. By resorting to their training and team concept of
staying together and communicating, they were a united force. By
being able to respond with assault rifles to match the suspect,
and by laying down cover fire that was well aimed and very
effective in keeping the suspect on the defensive, they were able
to deploy at three specific shooting positions. When one of the
officers' weapons malfunctioned, this was communicated by voice
and that officer was supported by accurate fire until the officer
was able to return fire again. The officers preparation and
training allowed them to immediately recognize the tactical
solution - to prone out and attack the legs of the suspect under
the vehicle. The wounds that led to the death of the suspect were
all in the legs with the exception of a very serious arm wound.
The
single most important component of the SWAT response to this
shooting was the ability of the responding SWAT officers to go
directly to the scene with all of the necessary weaponry and body
armor. The fact that the LAPD SWAT
officers carry all of their equipment with them while on duty, as
well as taking it home (in their police vehicles) when off duty,
allowed for response without a time consuming delay for issuance
of weapons and equipment. The LAPD SWAT
officers were also able to select appropriate weapons because
they have the choice in their car
of MP5s, M26s, Shotguns, H&K .223 caliber assault rifles and
AR 15s. They learned long ago that certain weapons are needed for
specific tactical functions. MP5s are a fine weapon, but are not
the best choice for the situation confronting LAPD SWAT on this
day. It is essential that SWAT officers have
weapons available with them,
and that they have the choice of weapons and ammunition to match
the tactical problem.
FUTURE
WEAPONS CONSIDERATIONS
The
patrol officers should have had small caliber rifle capability.
Had they been issued this essential piece of equipment, head
shots were a possible solution for them. Without a Ruger 9MM or
40 S&W rifle, or an AR 15 or M16, head shots that could have
ended the threat were out of the question. The political
environment in the City of Los Angeles borders on a third world
mentality and it may never be possible to provide this easy to
use and accurate weapon.
Safariland's distributor in San
Diego, Don Hacklander, regularly demonstrates the safety and ease
of the urban rifle by taking a police academy's poorest shooting
cadet and in 15 minutes having that cadet shooting 50 yard head
shots. This simplicity of training, citizen safety through
accuracy, and low cost can only be achieved through an urban
rifle such as the Ruger 9MM or 40 S&W. Agencies large and
small should consider deployment of this weapon, not as a
replacement for the shotgun, because it can't, but as an
enhancement of officer capability and accuracy which it can.
FUTURE
ARMOR CONSIDERATIONS
Police
body armor must be at pace with the types and kinds of threats
that can face the field police officer. Safariland has developed a
tactical vest for patrol use that can effectively stop assault
rifle impacts. This vest is a Tactical Level 3A with the ability
to insert Class 3 and Class 4 plates. Its relatively low cost and
its ability to blend with the patrol officer's duty belt
equipment set up makes it a fine tactical option.
LIABILITY
ISSUES
There
are few who would criticize LAPD on their performance during this
violent confrontation with murderous felons. The suspects,
Phillips and Martasaurano were experienced, well trained,
committed terrorists. The violent assault they perpetrated upon
innocent citizens including children was atrocious. Some allege
that the police did not provide medical attention in a timely
manner and that caused the death of the suspect, Martasaurano.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
When
the final suspect surrendered, wounded citizens were scattered
throughout the area. Wounded police officers were lying in
parking lots and the street. Both the citizens and the police
were a priority for two important reasons. First, they come
before suspects when there is a "waiting list" for
medical attention. Second, the police and EMT personnel did not
know if Martasaurano was in possession of explosives or was
"booby-trapped." Based upon the suspect's actions and
appearance, these concerns were very real. Only when a suspect is
rendered safe and can be searched safely can medical aid be
risked.
Police
training and the foremost experts recommend extreme caution, and
response to citizens and officers first, under the circumstances
that confronted the LAPD SWAT team. The National Tactical Officers
Association's Tactical Emergency Medical Section has
trained hundreds of officers to respond just as the LAPD SWAT
team did. Medical doctors familiar with this kind of tactical
medical emergency would and have endorsed the actions of the LAPD
SWAT team.
Finally, as a former member of the LAPD SWAT team, I want to extend my congratulationsto the brave patrol officers as well as to SWAT for a job well done.
History of LAPD's Communications Division